A Typhoon, Taiwan, and the Vatican’s Subtle Diplomacy

By Marco Baratto

A devastating typhoon has struck wide areas of East Asia in recent days: the Philippines, the island of Taiwan, Hong Kong, China's Guangdong region, and Vietnam. In the face of a humanitarian disaster of such magnitude, the Holy Father's message was, as always, marked by spiritual closeness and solidarity with the affected populations. Yet, hidden in those few words spoken during the Angelus lies a detail of far greater significance, one that touches on the delicate balance of Vatican geopolitics: the Pope referred to the "island of Taiwan" rather than, as diplomatic custom would have dictated, the "Republic of China."

A nuance, yes—but nuances are the substance of diplomacy. And in the context of relations between the Holy See, the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan, every word carries enormous weight.

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A Question of Recognition

Today, the Holy See is one of the very few states in the world that maintains official relations with Taiwan, heir to the old Republic of China, which retreated to the island after the Communist victory in 1949. Since 1971, the year when mainland China obtained its permanent seat at the UN, the post of apostolic nuncio in Taipei has remained vacant. The office is overseen only by a chargé d'affaires—tangible proof of an institutional bond still in place, though increasingly attenuated.

Strictly speaking, protocol would have suggested referring to the devastation of the typhoon by mentioning the "Republic of China," the official name recognized by the Holy See. Instead, the Pope chose a neutral expression: "the island of Taiwan." A detail that does not amount to recognition of Chinese sovereignty, but at the same time avoids explicitly reaffirming support for Taipei. It is a linguistic shift that mirrors reality: in the eyes of the Vatican, Taiwan's position is progressively weakening.

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A Church Between Two Fires

The reason for this lexical shift is not hard to grasp. The Catholic Church in China finds itself in a complex and fragile situation. On one hand, the Holy See wishes to ensure pastoral freedom for bishops and the faithful, who are often divided between the "official" community recognized by Beijing and the "underground" community that remains loyal to Rome. On the other, the Chinese government insists on exercising strict control over religions, which it sees as potential threats to social order.

Since 2018, a provisional agreement between the Vatican and China on the appointment of bishops has been in force, renewed several times—a cautious attempt to strike a balance. Yet the risk for the Holy See is twofold: losing pastoral influence over millions of Chinese Catholics, or leaving room for the many pseudo-religious sects proliferating across Asia, which attract those seeking authentic spirituality but lack deep roots.

It is therefore clear that Rome cannot ignore mainland China for much longer. To do so would be a grave strategic mistake.

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The Taiwan Question: A Loyalty in Doubt

Taiwan has always regarded the Holy See as a precious ally. Not only for its spiritual significance, but also for its political weight: recognition from a state with the Vatican's moral authority provides international legitimacy that few others can offer. Yet, the signals in recent years have been far from encouraging.

Through his choice of words, the Pope indicated that the Holy See no longer wishes to be perceived as a direct party in the sovereignty dispute over Taiwan. By referring to it simply as an "island," he depoliticized the term, stripping it of its statehood implications and situating the event—a typhoon—within a purely geographic rather than political framework. It is a symbolic step, but anyone familiar with diplomatic dynamics knows that symbols often herald future change.

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A Possible Way Forward: Macau

What compromise, then, might allow the Vatican not to abandon Taiwan entirely, while at the same time moving closer to the People's Republic of China?

One possible solution could be the reopening of a nunciature in Macau, a Special Administrative Region with a long Catholic history, a former Portuguese colony, and today part of China under the "one country, two systems" model. Macau offers neutral ground—less exposed than the highly sensitive Hong Kong and Taipei—while serving as a natural bridge to the mainland.

Such a choice would carry at least three strategic advantages:

1. Reciprocal legitimacy – The Vatican would signal openness to Beijing without abruptly severing ties with Taiwan.

2. Pastoral proximity – Establishing a presence in a region with a strong Catholic identity would allow closer oversight of the faithful throughout southern China.

3. Symbolic value – Macau, with its history as a meeting point between East and West, would perfectly embody the Church's universal mission.

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Between Realpolitik and Evangelical Mission

The Taiwan question illustrates, in striking fashion, the tension between realpolitik and evangelical mission. On the one hand, the Vatican must act as an international political actor, negotiating with China for a presence that guarantees religious freedom. On the other, it cannot betray the loyalty of Catholic communities such as Taiwan's, which have kept alive a strong bond with Rome for decades.

The Pope has chosen the path of nuance, of calibrated wording: "the island of Taiwan." A signal that the Church does not intend to take sides openly in the sovereignty dispute, but instead seeks to remain present in Asia with a universal, non-divisive outlook.